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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD J. JAMISON, SR., 
et al., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
UTAH HOME FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent, Donald Jamison, Jr., was injured in an 
automobile accident and sought to recover $12.00 per day in 
lieu of reimbursement for expenses for services, together with 
attorneys fees, interest and costs, from the Insurance 
Company, Utah Home Fire, under Utah's No-Fault Law. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Trial Judge, Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., 
found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded $12.00 per day for 
Case No. 
14523 
112 days, from November 19, 1974, to March 11, 1975, the 
period of disability of Plaintiff, totalling $1,344.00. 
In addition, the Trial Court allowed $4 75.00 as attorneys 
fees, interest at 18% per annum on the $1,344.00 commencing 
from May 22, 1975 until paid, and costs of Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In addition to the facts stated by counsel for appel-
lant, it should be noted that Plaintiff, Donald Jamison, Jr., 
by reason of the accident and injuries bringing him within 
Utah's No-Fault Law, was unable to perform his usual house-
hold duties and services for a period of 112 days, November 
19, 1974, to March 11, 1975 (R - 23). Furthermore, demands 
were made upon Defendant through their agent, to pay the 
benefits under the No-Fault Law and a form, provided by 
Defendant's agent, was submitted by Plaintiff on Apri] 16, 
1975 (R - 16), and more than 35 days elapsed before any bene-
fits were paid to Plaintiff, but no benefits have been paid 
to date involving the "Disability benefits" referred to 
under the statute 31-41-6 (b) (ii) . 
Certain medical benefits were paid by Defendant company 
for Plaintiff by the middle of June, 19 75, and a stipulation 
was entered into reserving Plaintiff's rights as to the $12.00 
per day, attorneys fees and interest issues under the No-
Fault laws. (Exhibit 3) 
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At the trial it was further stipulated that the 
failure to pay the disability benefits C$12,00 per day) by 
Defendant is part of the claim, or benefits, referred to in 
31-41-8 of the act for which interest and attorneys fees 
may be applicable. (R 6-8) 
Also, counsel for Plaintiff performed considerable 
legal services in this case, the reasonable value of which 
does not seem to be in dispute, (R-41-42) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED SECTION 
31-41-6 (b)(ii) IN ALLOWING $12.00 PER DAY TO 
PLAINTIFF IN LIEU OF REIMBURSEMENT FOR EXPENSES 
FOR SERVICES, UNDER THE UTAH AUTOMOBILE NO-
FAULT INSURANCE ACT. 
The Respondents could not better submit an argument 
against Appellant's Point I than to quote the studied and 
well reasoned comments of Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Jr. 
following submission of the case for the Court's decision, 
beginning at Page 44 of the record# Judge Hanson reasoned 
as follows: 
"THE COURT: Of course, in the State of Utah 
we do not have a legislative history such as the 
Congressional Record or the laws and record of 
jproceedings that Congress has, so we don't always 
have the best information as to what the Legis-
lature had in mind when it enacted any particular 
provision. But I'm sure that if there is any-
thing that is clear from the legislative history 
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from the no-fault legislation, it is first of 
all and foremost of all that it was not insur-
ance provisions, but rather, it was the insur-
ance carriers who were pushing that, and this 
was done with the representation that in the 
long haul the costs of insurance would be con-
siderably less and that this would be in the 
interest of Utah. It may not have turned out 
exactly that way, but that was the original 
intent, I am sure, when the insurance carriers 
were lobbying for this particular legislation. 
Now, the effect of this legislation is really 
reflected in Section 31-41-9 which says, 'No 
person for whom direct benefit coverage is 
provided for in this Act shall be allowed to 
maintain a cause of action for general damages 
arising out of personal injuries alleged to have 
been caused by an automobile accident, except 
where there has been caused by this accident any 
one or more of the following: death, dismember-
ment, or fracture, permanent disability, perma-
nent disfigurement, or medical expenses to a person 
in excess of $500.' 
Now, apparently there is no claim that the 
injuries that were sustained here fall without 
the nc-fault coverage, so we then look to the no-
fault provisions to see what type of coverage was 
contemplated by the Legislature in lieu of 
general damages or damages of a general nature. 
First of all will be medical benefits not 
to exceed $2,000. 
The second type of coverage — and I am not 
taking these necessarily in order — would be fun-
eral, burial benefits not to exceed $1*000, sur-
vivor benefits to compensate survivors or heirs 
in the sum of $2,000. 
Then finally, disability benefits of two 
types: one relating to a loss of gross income 
described in terms of 85 percent for up to 52 
weeks, and thereafter not to exceed $150 per week 
based upon inability to work; the second type of 
disability benefit talks in terms that have been 
discussed by counsel as "in lieu of" reimburse-
ment for expenses, which would have been reasonably 
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incurred for services that but for the injury 
insured insured person would have performed 
for his household, and regardless of whether 
any of these expenses are actually incurred. 
And of course that is the problem that we are 
dealing with here. 
The Legislature also talked in terms of 
minimum benefits and this, of course, referred 
to insurance policies containing at least this 
minimum coverage that we just talked about. I 
take it that it was contemplated that one could 
acquire insurance policies that would provide 
for greater benefits, but that no no-fault cover-
age could have less than this, and I think -chat 
is what the word 'minimum" meant, so it wasn't 
in terms that someone is entitled to more than 
is set forth in this, unless the insurance policy 
provides for more than is set forth in 31-41-6. 
Now, when the Legislature took away the gen-r 
eral right, the common law right of an injured 
person to recover general damages, the question 
then arises: What did they intend to give in 
lieu thereof? What were they intending to take 
away? Everything? Or were they intending to 
somewhat fix the risk that an insurance carrier 
would have to have in this type of situation, that 
is, were they not attempting to do something 
similar to Workmen's Compensation so that the 
insurance carrier could say, "We look at this 
particular injury and we know under our policy 
that we will have no more than $2,000 plus 85 
percent of the lost gross income if a person is 
working" — and in this case the person wasn't 
working, so they could exclude that $2,000 medi-
cal and $12 x 365, or the sum of approximately 
$4,000 there, and funeral benefits and survivor 
benefits didn't apply here — so the insurance 
company knew that its reserves for this type of 
injury would have to be something in the neighbor-
hood of $6,000 as opposed to the former situation 
where they had to hold out reserves based upon a 
prayer in a Complaint of maybe 30 or 40 thousand 
dollars. Of course, the reserves problem has 
plagued the insurance companies all along. We see 
this particularly in medical malpractice. So it 
was legislation that was directed toward giving the 
insurance carrier some certainty as to the amount 
of risk that they would have to bear. 
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Now, with that general discussion we look, 
then, at the situation here. There's no doubt 
about the fact that dealing with a 12-year-old 
boy, and I suppose that there would be no dispute 
if we were dealing with a 32-year-old housewife 
that the housewife would be entitled to $12 reim-
bursement for that period of time which she would 
be unable to perform services. The Legislature 
talks about the services that an injured person 
would have performed for his household. And in 
defining 'person1 in 31-41-3, the Legislature 
didn't feel it was important to define 'person' 
in any other way than to say 'person includes 
every natural person, firm, partnership, associ-
ation, corporation, or any governmental entity, 
or agency of it.' So it includes everything, 
everything and everyone. There was no exclusion 
as to what 'person' meant. And I take it by that 
that there was no exclusion as to what 'injured 
person' meant. 
The question then resolves itself since the 
Legislature did not intend to limit who the in-
jured person was who had performed services for 
his household, that they did not intend to limit 
it to 32-year-old housewives or exclude a 32-year-
old husband who also performed chores around the 
house, or a 12-year-old boy who likewise performs 
services, even though they may have some additional 
purposes such as training him in the useful art 
of performing chores around the house. 
So I find that the Legislature intended this 
provision to be somewhat of a Workmen's Compen-
sation like provision to provide a reparation on 
some certain basis for anyone who is injured, who 
the evidence shows performed household services. 
Nov/, also, they did not intend or attempt to 
describe what they meant by 'household services' 
or what the extent of those services would be, and 
I suppose that if you had a factual situation where 
the husband does the dishes, gets the kids ready 
for school, makes the beds, cooks the meals, and 
does the housekeeping, that an injured 32-year-old 
housev/ife would be excluded. J don't thing that 
they intended that. So the fact that a minimal 
or nominal amount of service is provided by a 
12-year-old boy, I think the Legislature intended 
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that this be covered. And I find that based 
upon the testimony, he did provide household 
services and that during a period of time he 
was unable to perform those because of his 
injuries." 
No doubt the legislature put the "allowance of $12.00 
per day" for household services "whether any of these ex-
penses are actually incurred" so there would be no quibling 
about what those services are worth. If this were a house-
wife involved, rather than young man, and she had to hire 
someone to perform her household services it would cost 
from $30.00 to $50.00 a day. So if the shoe were on the 
other foot and she actually paid $30.00 a day to have her 
household services performed, would appellants be willing to 
pay the actual expense? Of course they wouldn't. So Appell-
ant's argument, it would seem, is asking the Court to construe 
the $12.00 as the maximum but not the minimum it is liable for. 
There is only one construction that can be drawn from 
the statue, and that is for any loss of service "in lieu of 
reimbursement regardless whether any of these expenses are 
actually incurred," the allowance shall be $12*00 a day, 
Yourg Jamison did perform housahold services thrt he 
waii prevented from doing because of the injuries. He took 
out the garbage, cleaned his room, washed dishes, vacuumed 
carpets, helped with the groceries- washed the ccr and was 
available to help cut wherever needed as a son. It is enough 
under 31-41-6 (b)(ii) that he performed services, prior tc 
the injuries, and further than that is not material in this case. 
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POINT IT, 
TI7^  TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ALLOWED ATTORNEYS 
FEES, INTEREST, AND COSTS IN THE CASE. 
Inasmuch as the attorneys for the parties hereto 
stipulated with the Court that if Plaintiff were entitled 
to an allowance of $12,00 per day "in Ilea of reimbursement 
for expenses/1 then it was understood and agreed that such 
claim, or disability benefit under 31-41-6 (b)(ii) came 
within 31-41-8 of the Act and would be applicable as cover-
ing the issue of interest and attorneys fees in that section, 
(R-5-8) 
Counsel for Appellant argues in his brief, however, 
that the section is not applicable here because no reasonable 
proof was offered of the expenses incurred for the services 
which the injured Jamison boy would have performed. 
It appears obvious that the wording of Section 31-41-8 
to-wit: "after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the 
fact and amount of expenses incurred during the period/1 
refers to actual expenses incurred, such as the medical ex-
penses, funeral and burial expenses, etc. mentioned under 
31-41-6. No actual expenses were incurred by Plaintiff in 
connection with his services and none were required under the 
Act for the $12.00 per day is "in lieu of reimbursement for 
expenses" and also "regardless of whether any of these 
-8-
expenses are actually incurred," 
Thus, when demand was made upon the Defendant insur-
ance company to pay the benefits under the act, which was 
done by April 16, 1976 (R.15), by filing the Proof of Claim 
form provided by the insurance company themselves, said 
Defendant company was provided all the facts and proof needed 
or required. There was nowhere on the form reference to 
the $12.00 per day matter, but demands had been made and re-
fused, finally resulting in the Complaint, filed on June 6, 
1976, setting forth the S12.00 per day issue. 
This Court is also referred to Judge Stevert Hanson 
Jrfs comments and reasoning on this issue for they are very 
germane. See pages 50 and 51 of the Record. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR TN ALLOWING 18% PER 
ANNUM INTEREST ON THE AMOUNT FOUND DUE UNDER 
THE ACT. 
Section 31-41-8 provides among other things: 
"The person entitled to such benefits may 
bring an action in contract to recover these 
expenses plus the applicable interest." 
First, what is the applicable interest? It is 1 1/2% 
per month an stated in the same section. In other words, 
the action in contract is for 1 1/2% interest per month. 
When the Respondent has a right of action in contract under 
the Statute it is the same as if Appellant had agreed in 
-9-
contract to pay said expenses which shall draw 1 1/2% per 
month interest. 
Appellants are taking a wrong construction of section 
15-1-4 when counsel states that the 18% interest: called 
for in 31-41-8 Monly applies until the Court judgment is 
rendered." Let us analyze it further. The section says 
"Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall conform 
thereto and shall bear the interest agreed upon by the par-
ties, which shall be specified in the judgment." In other 
words this is a judgment, a lawful contract made GO by statute 
and it was specified in the judgment. How could the language 
be plainer? 
It is not material here what other jurisdictions may 
have decided. Our statute, 15-1-4, has made it clear what 
Utah law is in this respect. 
POINT IV. 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED ADDITIONAL ATTORNEYS FEES 
AND COSTS IN ARGUING THIS APPEAL. 
By reason of the fact that Plaintiffs and Respondents 
have been required to pay additional attorneys fees in the 
sum of $400.00 in appealing these issues to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah, it is submitted to this Court 
that Plaintiffs should be entitled to reimbursement of these 
attorneys fees and costs, also as a part of section 31-41-8, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court's decision, allowing the $12.00 per 
day for 112 days to Plaintiff under 31-41-6 (b)(ii) of 
Utah's No-Fault Insurance Act, and the decision allowing 
attorneys fees and interest under 31-41-3 of the Act 
should be affirmed, together with costs and additional 
attorneys fees for this appeal. 
DATED this r)^f day of June, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
YWJNG, JR. 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent 
2188 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF this £)£{ day of 
June, 19 76, to L. L. Summerhays, attorney for Defendant-
Appellant, at 604 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111. 
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